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Frank H. Knight on the “Entrepreneur Function” in 
Modern Enterprise 
Ross B. Emmett† 
The true uncertainty in organized life is the uncertainty in an  
estimate of human capacity, which is always a capacity to meet 
uncertainty. 
-Frank H. Knight 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means argued that modern times required the rejection of the 
classic economics conception of business enterprise. For Berle and 
Means, the modern economy was dominated by corporations, whose le-
gal structure allowed the separation of operational control from the en-
terprise’s ownership. In consequence, one could no longer assume that 
free markets would lead to socially preferable outcomes. Competition 
among Adam Smith’s numerous artisan shops and merchant owned-and-
operated businesses had been replaced by industries dominated by a few 
large corporations, whose concentrated management operated indepen-
dently of its ownership, which was diffused across hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of isolated individuals. Diffused ownership with concentrated ma-
nagerial control in oligopolistic industries could then lead to outcomes 
that were less than socially optimal. 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation 
raised two related questions for Berle and Means. First, if stockholders 
were no longer responsible for operational decisions, should they be en-
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titled to be the residual claimants on profits?1 Second, given that manag-
ers, rather than owners, had control, could “social and legal pres-
sure . . . be applied” to management to ensure that corporations operated 
“in the interests of some . . . wider group,” or “all society”?2 
Berle and Means’s claim that the separation of ownership and con-
trol mattered for industrial society and policy set their theory of the cor-
poration on a collision course with neoclassical economic theory. Just 
eleven years before their book appeared, neoclassical theory was given a 
coherent theory of business profit in Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertain-
ty, and Profit (RUP).3 In a perfectly competitive world, Knight argued, 
economic profit was eliminated because no economic agent experienced 
uncertainty. Not only were all opportunity costs and benefits known to 
the agents in perfect competition, but individuals were certain of both 
their own and others’ desires and knew without doubt that parties would 
fulfill their contractual obligations. Decision-making in an environment 
of perfect competition was almost mechanical: as Knight later said, 
“[t]he Economic Man neither competes nor higgles . . . ; he treats other 
human beings as if they were slot machines.”4 
The presence of economic profit, therefore, signaled the presence of 
uncertainty. Yet Knight did not draw the same conclusion from the pres-
ence of uncertainty as Berle and Means. For Knight, at the core of the 
modern enterprise operating in the midst of uncertainty was a small 
group of owners and managers who together performed the entrepre-
neurial function of providing “responsible direction of economic life,” 
the neglected feature of which was the inseparability of two elements: 
“responsibility and control.”5 
While Knightian uncertainty is often characterized as an expression 
of the limitations of human knowledge, Knight argued it posed both 
problems of morals and knowledge. Responsible control required wise 
judgment not only about courses of action the outcomes of which could 
only be estimated, but also about the capacity of others to make wise 
judgments in the face of uncertain outcomes. The profit and loss of the 
enterprise was thus a return on entrepreneurs’ business judgments re-
garding both the outcomes of decisions and others’ capacities to make 
decisions in the midst of uncertainty. The implication of Knight’s focus 
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on inseparability is clear: those who fulfill the entrepreneurial role are 
not merely “passive property owners”6 whose claims on business profits 
can be ignored in pursuit of the wider community’s interests. 
This Article explores Knight’s theory of the entrepreneurial func-
tion in the modern enterprise in two contexts. The first is Berle and 
Means’s arguments, in which I offer a reconstruction of Knight that re-
sponds to the argument in The Modern Corporation regarding both the 
corporate separation of ownership and control, and the potential for in-
dustrial policy to promote the social interest. The second context I use to 
explore Knight’s understanding of entrepreneurship is his later argu-
ments regarding the problem of intelligent control in a democratic socie-
ty. From the 1930s to the end of his life in the early 1970s, Knight in-
creasingly focused on the nature of a free, democratic society and the 
attendant problems for a social science that wishes to inform democratic 
action. While it is convenient to divide his life’s work into two parts—
the first focused on economic theory (ending in the early 1940s) and the 
second on social philosophy—the two are connected by a conception of 
human and social action in the midst of uncertainty that runs from RUP 
to Knight’s last book, Intelligence and Democratic Action.7 
Part II lays out the basic structure of Knight’s theory of human and 
social action. Two features of uncertainty in modern political economy—
namely, the principal–agent and moral hazard problems—are empha-
sized in Part III, and their implications for Knight’s theory of entrepre-
neurship and his understanding of the potential for social control are de-
veloped. Finally, Part IV summarizes the essential features of a Knigh-
tian response to Berle and Means. 
II. KNIGHT ON HUMAN ACTION 
A. Individual Action 
The primary problem of human action, in Frank Knight’s view, is 
not the instrumental choice of an action that satisfies desires or wants. 
Rather, the first problem of action is discovering what one truly desires. 
That is, at the heart of every choice humans make is not the problem of 
want-satisfaction, but of want-valuation. The chief thing that the com-
mon-sense individual actually wants is not satisfactions for the wants 
which he has, but more, and better wants. The things that he strives to get 
in the most immediate sense are far more what he thinks he ought to 
want than what his untutored preferences prompt. 
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Life is not fundamentally a striving for ends, for satisfactions, but 
rather for bases for further striving; desire is more fundamental to 
conduct than is achievement, or perhaps better, the true achievement 
is the refinement and elevation of the plane of desire, the cultivation 
of taste. And let us reiterate that all this is true to the person acting, 
not simply to the outsider, philosophizing after the event.8 
Actual human actions are therefore moral judgments rather than 
mere felicitous calculations, mechanical and chemical reactions, or in-
stinctual responses. Such judgment is difficult, even in the context of a 
single person’s decision-making. It not only requires rationality, to be 
sure, but also a degree of self-knowledge plus the virtues of courage, 
temperance, and prudence to carry out. Moreover, choices are perpetual-
ly prone to error, and not simply because we make mistakes emerging 
from our lack of knowledge about resources and tools. Error also occurs 
because we are exploring our values; even when we know the desire we 
seek to satisfy, we may later realize that it was not what we truly desired. 
And of course, there is always the problem classical philosophers called 
akrasia—weakness of will, or acting in ways we know to be against our 
better judgment. 
In a world with many humans, individual action becomes vastly 
more complex because it requires estimation of others’ judgments.9 
Knight argues the complexity is not only due to the lack of knowledge of 
other humans, but also fundamental uncertainty because others are often 
unsure how they will behave. If life is an exploration of values,10 then 
human action is perpetually done in the midst of uncertainty, not only 
because of individual exploration, but also because of the exploration of 
all those similarly engaged. 
In some cases, including the entrepreneurial context, uncertainty in-
cludes not only uncertainty about others’ actions, but also uncertainty 
regarding the courage and willingness of others to act. Thus, human ac-
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tion becomes a moral, as well as a knowledge, problem. All of these fac-
tors thus make human action a moral, as well as an intellectual, problem. 
For most, certain areas of action are less explorative than others. 
Relationships are built over time, surprise us while they are developing, 
and provide stability once built. Rules and social conventions emerge as 
ways to structure common interactions that remove our need to make 
constant judgments about mundane (and sometimes not so mundane) 
actions. Contracts provide stability by reducing the range of uncertainties 
in our dealings with other parties. Institutions and organizations emerge 
to monitor, organize, and enforce rules and contracts, providing further 
stability and reducing the need for judgment in every aspect of our ac-
tion.11 
But judgment is still required, and some of us (or perhaps all of us 
at various times in some aspect of our life) are looking for challenges. As 
Knight said, “It is because human beings do not completely ‘know what 
they are doing’—particularly the consequences very far ahead—that life 
presents problems; and one result is that the entrepreneur function in 
economics exists and comes to be in all degrees specialized in a limited 
number of individuals.”12 
Entrepreneurs are those persons who take challenges and are confi-
dent enough to back up their business engagement with financial re-
sources they may lose.13 In The Ethics of Competition, written a year af-
ter the publication of RUP, Knight argued that entrepreneurs deliberately 
constrain their consumption (i.e., want-satisfaction) in order to free re-
sources and release their attention for the pursuit of challenges offered by 
the business “game.” Like all good games, the business game has known 
rules but an unpredictable outcome. Winners cannot be predicted in ad-
vance, but depend upon some combination of innate ability, learning 
from prior experience, exerted effort, and luck. (If it was not so, the 
Yankees would win every year.) “Where ‘records’ are made, the interest 
centers in the unpredictable fluctuations in the powers of men (or horses, 
etc.) from one trial to another.”14 And if you are not willing to have any 
“skin in the game,” then you are not an entrepreneur. 
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And what if you are certain that you are not going to be an entre-
preneur? What happens as you interact with others in a complex, uncer-
tain world? Having emerged from a religious background, which made 
him sensitive to moral criticisms of capitalism that emerged from Victo-
rian England,15 Knight considered this question. Near the end of RUP, 
Knight argued that society’s central problem was the creation of a means 
for individuals to feel responsibility for their actions. Knight wrote that 
“[t]he insuperable difficulty of cooperative production has been to make 
the individual feel that the results depend upon his own activity.”16 
Echoing Karl Marx, Ruskin, and many others, Knight continued that, 
“[t]he individual feels lost in the mass, helpless and insignificant.”17  
The usual modern answer to alienation—a democratic society that 
allows the individual to participate in social action—was problematic to 
Knight. For Knight, the fundamental question underlying social action 
was whether intelligent democratic action could provide us with what we 
seek—a life that is challenging and interesting, and not merely one of 
consuming things and acquiring wealth.18 That, for Knight, was the fun-
damental problem underlying social action. 
B. Social Action 
Neoclassical welfare economics has long argued that the chief prob-
lem of social action is the aggregation of individual wants regarding col-
lectively provided goods. Yet Knight rejected this tradition from the out-
set.19 Under Knight’s theory, the primary problem of social action is not 
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the mechanical aggregation of preferences, for human language provides 
us with the means (i.e., discussion) to reach agreement on what we col-
lectively want. Rather, the primary problem is social agreement on the 
standards by which wants will be socially valued. That is, just as individ-
ual action is a judgment regarding want-valuation more than an act of 
want-satisfaction, so too is social action more a judgment regarding the 
choice of standards by which wants will be socially valued than an act of 
satisfying preferences regarding public goods. Instead of affirming the 
standard economic assumption that de gustibus non disputandum est,20 
Knight not only claimed that de gustibus is all humans argue about, but 
also that it is the primary form of social valuation.21 
Knight’s initial step from individual human action to social action 
is apparent in two writings produced shortly after RUP. The first was a 
series of lecture notes for his students at the University of Iowa, written 
in the mid-1920s, and used a decade later at the University of Chicago 
for a general social science undergraduate course. The notes were even-
tually published under the title The Economic Organization.22 In the first 
chapter, he identified the primary function of any form of economic or-
ganization as being that of “fixing standards”: “when the production of 
wealth is socialized, there has to be a social decision as to the relative 
importance of different uses of productive power, as to which wants are 
to be satisfied and which left unsatisfied or to what extent any one is to 
be satisfied at the expense of any other.”23 
The same problem emerges as central to social action in an essay on 
value theory from the same time period. Knight says: 
Acceptance of some kind and degree of validity in canons and stan-
dards of taste involves recognition of values which are more than 
factual desire and desire-satisfaction. As in the previous steps, valu-
ation involves desire, unquestionably; values are desired; much 
confusion arises from the human disposition to over-simplification, 
tending to assume that the two must be either identical or wholly 
different. . . . What is essential is the recognition that intelligent dis-
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cussion of conduct includes and requires acceptance of valuation or 
taste as more than motivation, as motivation is more than vegetable 
appetition plus awareness, and this more than force, and force more 
than laws of motion. This recognition of valuation introduces a new 
kind of possibility of error, error in regard to ends as well as error in 
regard to means.24 
The second essay also reminds us that the social decision to fix the stan-
dards by which values are judged emerges because of the fundamental 
uncertainty in our lives about what we value. But in both essays, Knight 
quickly raises the question: Who decides the standards? Most social 
scientists resort to the generic term “society” as an answer to that ques-
tion; Berle and Means, for example, argued that it is up to “society” or 
“the community” to decide how to control the modern corporation, with-
out concern for the problem of social agreement in the community. For 
Knight, however, social action is peculiar to democratic capitalism. In an 
authoritarian regime, the action of the dictator is the action of society 
(L’etat, c’est moi), and hence the result of individual judgment. In a de-
mocracy, social action requires discussion about what we want to do, and 
discussion of what to do is for Knight, as we have seen already, a discus-
sion of what we value. What wants will be satisfied? Which will not? 
How will we know the relative value of different uses of production? For 
Knight, a free society chooses to answer those questions through a price 
system in the economic realm, and democracy in the political realm. And 
the decision regarding the economic and political institutions that will 
shape social action is itself a moral judgment. Social action, then, “in the 
essential and proper sense, is group self-determination.”25 In fact, Knight 
argued that one should only speak of social action in the context of a 
free, democratic society. 
III. MORAL HAZARD AND PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEMS 
A. In the Context of Democratic Governance 
Echoing Viscount Bryce,26 Knight often said that democracy is 
“government by discussion.”27 Discussion is a form of human conduct, 
and hence Knight argued that our participation in it is susceptible to the 
entire range of our interests and motives. Despite our best intentions to 
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be rational participants, our participation in social discussion still in-
volves “an unanalyzable mixture of mechanical interaction, free ex-
change of [ideas], and also both giving and taking, by coercion or decep-
tion, on both sides.”28 Knight focused on two related features of our par-
ticipation in social action that emerge from the complex, “unanalyzable 
mixture”: they are what we now call the moral hazard and principal–
agent problems. 
Democratic discussion that leads to good judgments is costly to par-
ticipants, and hence, some members of a free society may seek to obtain 
the benefits of social action without incurring the cost. Those committed 
to democratic participation could find that others shirk their social re-
sponsibilities while benefiting from social action. In particular, Knight 
argued that free society was constantly in danger of its participants re-
placing discussion-based democratic judgment with some close substi-
tute. For example, from the late 1940s on, he characterized the appeal to 
moral authorities (moralism) and the appeal to scientific expertise (scien-
tism) as the chief threats to free society. When the moral authority of 
tradition or religion or the expert knowledge of a scientific community 
became the basis for policy, the action ceased to be a social action ac-
cording to Knight’s standard. At that point, members of society turned 
over their own judgment to another group. Knight never explicitly identi-
fied this democratic dilemma as a social version of the problem of moral 
hazard. But late in his career, his perpetual quest to shore up the institu-
tional structure of free markets and liberal democracy with an ethical 
defense of our devotion to participation in free discussion can be seen as 
a response to the moral hazard implicit in democratic governance of hu-
man social action.29 
The principal–agent problem is closely related to the moral hazard 
problem, but Knight seldom mentioned it in his later work on social ac-
tion. Yet the concept is discussed at length in the concluding chapter of 
RUP, “Social Aspects of Uncertainty and Profit.” The chapter is seldom 
mentioned in studies of Knightian uncertainty and is perhaps rightly ig-
nored as a meandering set of final thoughts, some rehearsing what was 
already said, and others more explorative than declarative. Among the 
latter is a discussion of the principal–agent problem in the modern enter-
prise and in modern democracies. Despite their brief and explorative na-
ture, Knight’s comments are remarkably prescient to Berle and Means’s 
argument in The Modern Corporation. 
Knight questioned whether managers in a modern enterprise would 
feel more responsibility for their decisions under a system of private 
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ownership or one of public ownership. Advocates of public ownership 
(socialism) argue, in a manner similar to what Berle and Means claimed 
eleven years later, that diffused private ownership of modern corpora-
tions leaves active managers disconnected from passive owners. Greater 
efficiency could be gained, the public ownership advocates claim, by 
substituting the public—“society”—for this dispersed body of private 
owners. We will return to Knight’s response to this claim in regard to its 
effect on the modern enterprise in a moment, but now look only at his 
response regarding how the manager would respond to society as his 
owner.30 
Earlier, we saw that Knight agreed with the critics of capitalism that 
the system alienates individuals, leaving them lost in the masses. But 
unlike the critics of capitalism,31 Knight argued that the feeling of insig-
nificance applies to the capitalist entrepreneur as well as laborers, for in 
modern society, even the capitalist is “really a social functionary.”32 Yet 
the problem with the critics’ position is that substitution of public control 
would only make that alienation worse, both for the capitalist-
entrepreneur and for society as a whole: 
If we get more effective management through the system of concen-
trated private ownership than we would through some democratic 
machinery, it is because men plan better when they do not feel like 
government officials doing things for other people, when they feel 
their work as their own and identify their personalities with it. 
And this even though the same men know “in their hearts,” 
subconsciously if not consciously, that they are the agents of the 
democracy and ultimately responsible to it for their trust. For it is 
clear that the “personal” interests which our rich and powerful busi-
ness men work so hard to promote are not personal interests at all in 
the conventional economic sense of a desire to consume commodi-
ties. . . . The real motive is the desire to excel, to win at a game, the 
biggest and most fascinating game yet invented, not excepting even 
statecraft and war.33 
For Knight, turning capitalist-entrepreneurs into public servants in a 
government bureaucracy would separate their interests from those of the 
society or community that charges them with the task of working on their 
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behalf. The principal–agent problem, therefore, is a significant issue in 
social action and undermines the effort of society to direct socially con-
trolled resources to productive ends. 
Even more importantly, the principal–agent relation between socie-
ty and public officials would lead to cautiousness on the part of public 
bureaucrats thrust into business management. They would make deci-
sions that maintain the status quo and act in favor of efficiency and ma-
nageable risks, rather than undertake entrepreneurial actions with the 
potential to move society forward. The claim that entrepreneurs will be 
too cautious in the face of uncertainty is false, Knight reminded his read-
ers as he closed the book, precisely because the challenges of contribut-
ing new value to people in an uncertain world is what entrepreneurs live 
for.34 
To Knight, both the problems of moral hazard and the coordination 
of incompatible principal–agent interests make social control of produc-
tive resources unlikely to produce the best possible outcomes. Achieving 
efficiency in resource utilization will be problematic, and social progress 
will be stymied by bureaucratic cautiousness. Unfortunately, even in-
creased social oversight of government—whether by scientific experts, 
blue-ribbon committees, congressional audits, or even citizen panels—
will not solve this central failure of social action. When Knight returned 
to this problem later in life, the only protection he could offer was the 
cultivation of a commitment to intelligent, free discussion among a liber-
al society’s citizenry: 
If free society is to persist, or improve, the people must learn that 
problems are to be solved only by intelligent agreement through ge-
nuine free discussion. . . . The possibilities of freedom in effectively 
organized society [have] sweeping limitations; but accepting these 
and working intelligently within their bounds, and not too discon-
tentedly, is the price of the residual freedom that is possible.35 
Despite clinging to the faint hope that liberal society might uphold the 
limited promise of “intelligent agreement through genuine free discus-
sion,”36 Knight’s recognition of the sweeping limitations moral hazard 
and principal–agent problems posed for intelligent social action (not to 
mention the romantic urge to appeal to moral solutions) made him fre-
quently despair that freedom could be retained. 
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B. In the Context of Entrepreneurial Action 
The four sentiments of the previous section regarding the prospects 
for intelligent social action do not apply equally to Knight’s assessment 
of the prospects for entrepreneurial action. Of course, given his generally 
dyspeptic approach, you will not be surprised if Knight is only slightly 
less skeptical of the potential success of market outcomes than of gov-
ernment action.37 After all, if the description of Knight’s theory of human 
action in Part II was correct, then his fundamental insight is that all hu-
man action (which is always action in the midst of uncertainty) is pla-
gued by the problem of moral hazard. Private control of productive re-
sources, then, faces the same moral hazard problem as social control. 
Yet in RUP, Knight argued that the principal–agent problem could 
be solved, and the moral hazard problem faced, if not overcome, in the 
context of entrepreneurial action. The entrepreneurial solution to the 
principal–agent problem includes two parts. First, despite the fact that 
dispersed ownership of the modern enterprise opens the possibility for 
owners and managers to have incongruent interests and expectations, 
Knight argues that in every successful modern enterprise there is a 
“small group of ‘insiders’ who are the real owners of the business.”38 The 
majority of the dispersed owners “do not regard themselves and are not 
regarded as owners,” a fact that the “insiders count upon”39—here Knight 
agrees with Berle and Means regarding the passivity of most corporate 
owners. But the insiders, as well as senior corporate managers, “know 
each other’s personalities, motives, and policies tolerably well.” Their 
common knowledge of, and accountability to, each other, as well as their 
mutual accountability, creates a cadre of company leadership that func-
tions like a single entrepreneur.40 Because the “entrepreneur function”41 
of making responsible judgments for the enterprise is carried out by a 
small group of owner-managers, there is no separation of ownership and 
control; “responsible direction” is carried out as if by a single person. 
The second aspect of Knight’s solution to the principal–agent prob-
lem harkens back to a central feature of his argument about why the 
problem is so difficult for social action: the manager’s feeling of respon-
sibility and accountability for his actions. We saw earlier that when the 
manager serves “society,” he loses any feeling of direct responsibility 
and accountability for his actions. Because he does not feel a connection 
                                                 
 37. In an earlier essay, I argued that RUP also reaches a similar conclusion regarding the pros-
pect for the Economist as “knower.” Ross B. Emmett, The Economist and the Entrepreneur: Modern 
Impulses in Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 31 HIST. POL. ECON. 29 (1999). 
 38. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 359.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 289. 
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to “society” at large, his actions serve his own interests. But in the enter-
prise, insiders who perform the entrepreneurial function do feel responsi-
ble and accountable. The sense of responsibility and accountability that 
owners and managers share in the modern enterprise allows them to ful-
fill the function played by the entrepreneur in the classic sole proprietor-
ship. 
Let me pause for a moment to suggest that Knight’s solution to the 
principal–agent problem highlights a problem with most interpretations 
of Knightian uncertainty. Most interpreters of Knight consider his contri-
bution to be the introduction of the notion that we do not entirely know 
what the future holds. Those who want to make a finer point note the 
distinction between risk and uncertainty is either between outcomes 
where probabilities can be assigned or not,42 or between insurable and 
uninsurable situations.43 For Knight, however, uncertainty is not simply a 
knowledge or insurability problem; it is what makes uncertainty uninsur-
able that matters. What we do not know—and what makes our own fu-
ture actions uncertain and hence uninsurable—is what we really want to 
accomplish by our own actions, and what drives other people to act. For 
Knight, then, uncertainty is fundamentally a moral problem.44 
The moral component of Knight’s conception of uncertainty is im-
portant as we turn to the moral hazard problem in the context of entre-
preneurial action. In the first Part, we saw that for Knight, those who ac-
cept the moral challenge of exercising responsible judgment regarding 
the use of resources in the midst of uncertainty are entrepreneurs. The 
entrepreneur accepts the challenge of acting even when there is a poten-
tial for moral hazard to exist, and backs it up by hazarding his own re-
sources.45 But the entrepreneur exercises responsible judgment in doing 
so. The key judgment the entrepreneur makes, Knight argued, regards his 
opinion of those with whom he contracts, including suppliers, workers, 
and clients. In an uncertain world, “attention and interest shift from the 
errors in men’s opinions of things to the errors in their opinions of 
men.”46 Frequently we speak of moral hazard and other problems of un-
certainty as unsolvable. Knight agrees, yet he says: “Like a large portion 
                                                 
 42. MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: A PROVISIONAL TEXT 282 (1976). 
 43. Stephen F. LeRoy & Larry D. Singell, Jr., Frank H. Knight on Risk and Uncertainty, 95 J. 
POL. ECON. 394 (1987). 
 44. In a 1951 essay that touches on entrepreneurship, Knight lends some credibility to the 
insurability account of uncertainty when he says: “Analytically, it is desirable to restrict entrepre-
neurial ‘risk’ to that which cannot be insured against or eliminated by grouping cases; it is common-
ly thought better to call it by the different term ‘uncertainty.’” Frank H. Knight, Economics and 
Ethics of the Wage Problem (1951), in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 4, at 345. But he goes on to 
discuss why such risks are uncertain in the same terms he did in RUP: the necessity of responsible 
direction and, in particular, the need to choose wisely in hiring one’s agents. 
 45. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 299.  
 46. Id. at 292.  
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of the practical problems of business life, as of all life, this one of select-
ing human capacities for dealing with unforeseeable situations involves 
paradox and apparent theoretical impossibility of solution. But like a host 
of impossible things in life, it is constantly being done.”47 The difference 
between the managerial function and the entrepreneurial function boils 
down to this: “the crucial decision is the selection of men to make deci-
sions, that any other sort of decision-making or exercise of judgment is 
automatically reduced to routine function.”48 For Knight, entrepreneurs 
earn their profit because they alone judge who they trust to make deci-
sions. 
IV. A KNIGHTIAN RESPONSE TO THE MODERN CORPORATION 
We are now ready to construct a Knightian response to Berle and 
Means’s claims regarding the modern enterprise and social control in The 
Modern Corporation.49 We proceed in three stages.50 
The first stage of construction concerns the claim that the modern 
corporation is characterized by the separation of ownership and control. 
Berle and Means are correct that diffused ownership causes some, if not 
most, shareholders to lose interest in operational control of the firm; 
these passive owners, Knight said, are similar to creditors and are re-
garded by the firm as such.51 But there is a subset of shareholders who, 
together with the core managerial leadership, take responsibility for di-
rection of the firm and also put their own resources at risk. To quote 
Knight, they are the ones who “venture”52 and fulfill the entrepreneur 
function. Thus, the initial stage of a Knightian response argues that Berle 
and Means are incorrect to claim that all shareholders are passive and can 
therefore be entirely separated from operational control of the firm. 
The second stage follows Berle and Means’s claim that, in absence 
of owner control of the firm, modern corporations can be directed by so-
ciety toward more beneficial societal goals. The Knightian response 
builds on the assumption, true enough in most democratic societies, that 
                                                 
 47. Id. at 298. 
 48. Id. at 297 (emphasis in original). 
 49. An interpretation of Berle and Means that is consistent with the claims this Knightian re-
sponse is aimed at can be found in Erika George, See No Evil? Revisiting Early Visions of the Social 
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 51. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 358–59. 
 52. Id. at 269. 
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representatives of “society”—elected officials perhaps, as well as bu-
reaucrats and regulators—would act on behalf of society to provide di-
rection of the corporations. In the final chapter of RUP, Knight argued 
that these representatives—“agents” of the people, if you will—are 
placed in the same position in relation to “society” that Berle and Means 
argued managers hold in relation to the stockholders of the modern cor-
poration. Thus, substituting “society” for a corporation’s “ownership” 
does not solve the principal–agent problem, and probably intensifies it, 
because “society” is far more diffuse than the ownership of any modern 
corporation. 
Before moving to the third stage, we should pause to acknowledge 
a possible problem with the second stage of the Knightian response. 
Knight does not abandon methodological individualism as he moves 
from considerations of individual action to social action. Rather than 
adopt an organic conception of society (i.e., methodological collectiv-
ism), he saw social action as the actions individuals take as a result of 
laws constructed through intercommunication (through formal and in-
formal discussion) among individuals in society.53 If Berle and Means 
based their argument regarding social control of the modern corporation 
on organicism, one could defend their position on the grounds of their 
methodological starting point. At many points, they do indeed appear to 
operate with an organic conception of society; for example, when they 
claim that the modern corporation places “the community in a position to 
demand” that the corporation serve “all society,”54 or speak of the “eco-
nomic organism” as superseding the state “as the dominant form of so-
cial organization.”55 But at other points they sound more like Knight: 
It remains [after the creation of the modern corporation] only for the 
claims of the community to be put forward with clarity and force. 
Rigid enforcement of property rights as a temporary protection 
against plundering by control would not stand in the way of modifi-
cation of these rights in the interests of other groups. When a con-
vincing system of community obligations is worked out and is gen-
erally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today 
must yield before the larger interests of society.56 
                                                 
 53. Knight’s adoption of functionalist language (“entrepreneur function” and “social functiona-
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While one could reconcile their talk of groups with organicism, a “con-
vincing system of community obligations” would be “worked out” and 
“generally accepted” by individuals engaged in deliberative discussion, 
that is, by Knightian social action. Their lack of clarity regarding the na-
ture of “community” and “social interest” lends force to the Knightian 
critique. 
Assuming the methodological individualist position Knight adopts, 
the third stage of a Knightian response addresses the moral hazard prob-
lem. In Knight’s view, moral hazard creates more problems for social 
control than the principal–agent problem. Participation in social discus-
sion is distributed widely, but control by what Knight called social func-
tionaries is concentrated in individuals that could actively use their posi-
tion to better their own welfare rather than the common interest. And 
there is little in Berle and Means’s argument about society and the social 
control of the modern corporation to stop them. Assuming politicians and 
bureaucrats are socially benevolent, and giving them control over vast 
economic power in the name of social good is hazardous, as we knew 
long before Knight. 
In the modern enterprise, Knight argues, the moral hazard problem 
also exists, but the “entrepreneur” accepts that hazard because he trusts 
his judgment regarding the capacity of people to face uncertainty. He 
may be wrong, but he then bears the financial and operational responsi-
bility for that failure. In society, no such entrepreneur exists. Social con-
trol faces the prospect of failure from both principal–agent and moral 
hazard problems. The modern enterprise, under the leadership of an en-
trepreneurial group, eliminates the principal–agent problem, and accepts 
the challenge of responsible direction knowing moral hazard problems 
may appear. To expect more would be a denial of the basic uncertainty of 
the world in which humans act. 
